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Summary
Naive realism is a widely debated topic in the philosophy of the mind. In this article I will review the
theses  of  naive  realism  through  the  works  of  one  of  the  most  influential  philosophers  who
supported and developed them, Michael Martin.  Once the reasons why naive realism should be
supported are discussed, I will propose an empirical argument to show that naive realism and the
most basic scientific knowledge of perceptive processes are contradictory.
Introduction
Naive realism is a philosophical position at the center of the debate on perception in philosophy of
the  mind.  Thanks  to  the  importance  of  studies  on  perception,  naive  realism has  attracted  the
interests not only of philosophers of the mind but also of students of semantics, epistemology and
of those who deal with determining the nature of phenomenal consciousness. For naive realism, the
metaphysical structure of conscious perceptual experience cannot help but involve material objects
independent of the mind.
The  philosophical  position  that  currently  opposes  this  way  of  seeing  things  is  called
representationalism. Those who hold the representationalism view believe that perception has the
characteristic of being an intentional activity.  The perceiving subject is intentionally  linked to a
representational content. When we perceive we see the world being in a certain way. As an example,
we perceive that “A is red”.
If we see an object X as Y, this is our view of the world around us. Such content can be real or not. If
real, we are dealing with a genuine perception. Otherwise, it is an illusion or a hallucination. Usually
those  who  embrace  representationalism  contend  that  naive  realism  supporters  fail  to  explain
phenomena such as hallucinations and illusions.
In  this  article  I  will  review the  theses  of  naive  realism through  the  works  of  one of  the  most
influential  philosophers  who  supported  and  developed  them,  Michael  Martin.  Once  we  have
understood the reasons why Martin  believes that  naive  realism should be supported,  I  will  put
forward  an  empirical  argument  to  demonstrate  how  naive  realism  contradicts  the  most  basic
scientific knowledge of perceptual processes.
The naive realism of Michael Martin
In The Transparency of Experience, Martin addresses the problem of how naive realism can account
for  illusive  and  hallucinatory  experiences.  Martin  points  out  that  illusions,  hallucinations  and
perceptions can be considered totally different experiences. There is nothing strange in saying that
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perceiving means being in relation with objects of the world that surrounds us independent of the
mind whereas,  in  cases of  hallucination and illusion,  our  experience is  something substantially
different. Not even the fact that both illusions and hallucinations lead us to believe that we are
experiencing events in the world around us should make us conclude that they must have something
substantial  in  common  with  perceptions.  In  other  words,  it  is  not  enough  that  illusions,
hallucinations and perceptions are subjectively indistinguishable to conclude that they should have
some ingredients in common.
After The Transparency of Experience, the heart of naive realism was spelled out by Martin in the
article The limits of self-awareness:
«The Naïve Realist thinks that some of our sensory episodes are presentations of an experience-
independent reality. I am aware of the various elements that make up at North London street scene.
The same objects and aspects of these objects which I can expect to be when I pursue the question,
rather than writing my paper?» [1]
In  this  second  article,  Martin  carries  forward  and  elaborates  the  arguments  previously  seen,
considering the case of illusions no longer problematic. Martin argues that the broadest way to
account for any perceptive experience is to consider everything in that experience which cannot be
distinguished  from  careful  reflection  of  veridical  perceptions.  In  other  words,  characterizing
hallucinations negatively is for Martin the only way to account for hallucinations and perceptions as
perceptual experiences.
If  hallucinations  had  their  specific  mental  properties,  they  could  be  identified  through  careful
reflection, but this does not happen. We may have the necessary conditions to determine if it is a
hallucination only if we have the ability to discriminate mental properties of hallucinations when
they are present and to identify their absence when they are not.
Martin argues that there is a limit which awareness cannot go beyond. Precisely, this limit is the
impossibility to distinguish between hallucinations and veridical perceptions. The existence of this
limit is difficult to contest. But if this limit exists for Martin, then representationalism must be false.
Martin writes:
«If one cannot tell what it really takes for experience to be one way rather than another, why should
we think that one can still always tell that some mental presentation or other must be responsible
for things to seem the way that they are? So the epistemological commitments of Common Kind
view seem to be in tension with the reasons for accepting them.» [2]
In On Being Alienated Martin seeks further to shelter naive realism from skeptical Cartesian and
Humean arguments. These arguments are taken as exemplary cases which give rise to the debate
over  naive  realism  and  how  to  account  for  hallucinatory  experiences  with  respect  to  veridical
perception. To the skeptical Cartesian question, “How do I know that what I’m perceiving is reality
and not  a  mere  dream or  the  work  of  an  evil  genius?”  Martin  replies  that  this  can  simply  be
answered that “I know because I’m really perceiving something”. In other words, to raise a doubt
there must be sufficient reasons for this doubt to make sense. If I perceive objects in the world
around me daily and if there are no internal motivations to my experience to make me suspect it is
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not genuine, then it makes no sense to raise a doubt like the Cartesian about the veracity of such
experiences.
Martin affirms:
«Before the sceptical challenge is raised, it seems as if there is a simple answer to the question,
how do you know that there is a white picket fence there? After all, you can simply see that there is
one there, and that you can see that one is there is something that you also have access to.» [3]
As  for  Humean  skepticism,  Martin  believes  that  it  is  reflected,  in  our  day,  by  the  famous
“hallucination argument” and its assumption that hallucinations and veridical perceptions are. For
Martin it can be denied that hallucinations and perceptions must be of the same kind. In fact, it can
be argued that on the one hand perceiving means entering in contact with objects of the world
around us.
On the other hand, hallucinations are something that deceives us in two different ways. Not only
does seem in the hallucination that there are objects in the environment that surrounds us, which in
fact are not there, but we even believe we are interacting with those objects, which is equally false.
Given  this  double  deception  it  is  illegitimate  to  think,  according  to  Martin,  that  because  in
hallucinatory cases we are deceived about what we are seeing, then we should think we are also in
cases of veridical perception.
In  What’s  in  a  look?  Martin  focuses  his  attention  on  propositions  that  indicate  the  vision  of
something like “that dog is brown”, “that cat looks sleepy” or other propositions of this kind. Some
of these propositions do nothing but bring our visual experience back while others have a subjective
nature for how they are used. For Martin in our talk of appearances and sensory states, as when we
say that “an object X seems Y”, we make a comparison between objects in which we decide whether
an object has a visible quality exactly as it is possessed by another object.
When we talk  about  visual  propositions,  according to  Martin,  we do nothing but  talk  about  the
visible qualities possessed by objects and from the semantic point of view there is not much else to
analyze. Representational theory like the other theories advanced over the years are all consistent
with this analysis of the propositions about visible qualities. But that means there’s nothing in our
way to report visible qualities that can be used to decide which of the multiple options is the best to
account for the metaphysics of perception.
In fact, Martin writes:
«The minimal semantics I  have offered is quite consistent with a representational or intentional
theory of sense experience and equally with a sense-datum approach. Nor have I said anything that
compromises naive realism. The aim here has not been to favour one such account over any other,
but rather to indicate reasons for why we should not look for evidence in favour of one of these
views over the any of the others in the ways in which we talk of appearances.» [4]
The results achieved by Martin in the course of his defense of naive realism in the four articles
briefly examined can be summarized as follows: (1) There is nothing in our way of talking about
what we see that can make us conclude in favor of one or the other philosophical position on the
structure of perceptual experience. (2) There is nothing in our way of perceiving reality that should
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make us think that what we perceive are not material objects of the environment that surrounds us,
independent of our mind. (3) Hallucinations can be characterized in such a way as to deny that they
must be of the same kind as the usual perceptive experiences. It can therefore be affirmed that (4)
perceiving means entering into contact with objects of the world that surrounds us independent of
the mind of the perceiving subject. The naive realism is therefore a philosophical position on the
metaphysical nature of perception if not correct, at least sustainable.
The naive realism and the scientific vision of sensory perception
The global function of the eye is to correctly project the light coming from the objects of the world
around us on the retina. The light enters from the cornea that focuses the pattern of light along with
the other lenses of the eye on the retina. The variable dilatation of the pupil helps to regulate the
amount of incoming light and the shape of eye lenses, excluding the cornea, varies as the distance
of the objects being observed varies.
The retina transforms the pattern of light into nerve signals conducted by the optic nerve. It allows
us to discriminate the wavelengths and therefore colors. It consists of three sections of nerve cells,
one occupied by cell bodies and the other by synapses formed by axons and dendrites of the same
cells. The most numerous cells, the rods, are used for night vision and are ultra-sensitive to the light
present,  being  able  to  discriminate  even  a  single  photon.  The  cones  on  the  other  hand  are
responsible for the discrimination of details and colors. The area of the retina most densely packed
with cones is the fovea which is also the area with the most discriminative power.
The nerve signal that starts from the cells of the retina after being excited by the light travels up to
the visual areas of the cerebral cortex where the signal coming from the retina is processed and
processed. Now, what is processed by the retina is not the observed object that belongs to the
environment that surrounds us but the light reflected by the object. Even if the light brought with it
all the necessary information on the object, light and object would remain two distinct things.
The important point here is not exactly what we see. The point is that we can neither say that we are
directly seeing either the objects of the world around us nor the pattern of light reflected by them.
This leads us to deny point (4) of Martin’s arguments and, if it  turns out that hallucinations are
phenomena of the visual cortical areas of the central nervous system, that point (3) is also very
doubtful. If the scientific narrative of perception is correct, then naive realism must be set aside and
the relative metaphysics of perceptual processes must be rethought.
Conclusions
The functioning of the visual apparatus as summarized above tells us that it is incorrect to assume
that what we experience on a daily basis are directly the material objects of the environment around
us. This contradicts the fundamental assumption of naive realism. Martin’s arguments, although
valid from a metaphysical point of view, clash irretrievably with what seems to be the scientific
studies concerning human vision.
Andrea Bucci
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